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“Reflections on American 
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Ash Carter, October 2018
Aditya Singh
If the ground is soft, dig deep.
— Old Chinese proverb.
Ash Carter, an academic with considerable experience in the Pentagon 
as also United States (US) Secretary of Defence from February 2015 to 
January 2017, is a strategic thinker. This is evident from his treatise on 
“Reflections on American Grand Strategy in Asia”1 which is easily one of 
the better essays on US President Barack Obama’s ‘rebalance’ and what 
should be done for its implementation. It is logically presented and charts 
the course to be followed to fulfil the medium and long-term interests of 
the US. 
Whether the Administration of President Donald Trump follows 
it is not the question, however, what it seeks to put forward are the 
“benefits of peace” and how it can be achieved in Asia by “the strategy 
of a principled,inclusive network”. While written from an American 
perspective, the arguments are cogent and relevant for the growth and 
development of the continent. His considerable knowledge of Chinese 
thinking and actions leads him to conclude that there must be every 
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effort at engagement. He argues that there are two competing strains 
in Chinese strategic thinking: one that values partnership and increased 
integration in global security structures and the other that leans toward 
unilateral action and refuses to acknowledge global norms when they are 
seen to inhibit China’s interests. With China’s continued growth and 
success, it is this second strain which now tends to dominate, hence, its 
actions of pushing forward and ‘digging deep’. In view of this, Carter 
argues that if this be so, it needs to be confronted, and balance needs to 
be ensured by a network of nations. To which, Carter pointedly notes 
that the US so far, has been pacifist in this regard.
Given the systemic changes at play, the key concern is attributed 
to China’s concept of the rejuvenation of the Middle Kingdom and 
demonstration that there is a proven alternative system to Western 
democracies to usher in a new world power. In addition, with centralisation 
of power, Chinese President Xi Jinping has acquired an ‘emperor’ status 
in the current times. However, unlike the USSR that wished to impose 
Communism, the Chinese are convinced that they can demonstrate to 
the world that their system, in which the state supersedes the individual, 
is the best. In doing so, the Chinese draw their assessments based on 
their great strength from history, and tyranny, which was intrinsic, and is 
glossed over. It is an autocratic system, far removed from liberal thinking 
which the most of the developed world follows. History has shown that it 
is such regimes that generate conflict, hence, the need for a 21st century 
approach to ensure peace.
This is more so as China is arming at a pace unseen in history. The 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been reorganised and the scope 
of changes is far greater than in the Germany of the 1930s. While the 
Chinese profess a ‘peaceful rise’, the capabilities they are acquiring will 
give them an offensive capacity across all domains—a cause of worry for 
their neighbours. Also their growing power and confidence exhibit a 
regular show of strength which smaller neighbours cannot counter. This 
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acquiescence too, can be compared to what happened during the rise of 
Nazi Germany.
Carter clarifies that the cornerstone of America’s defence is 
deterrence, which is ensured in Asia by 400,000 personnel of the US 
Pacific Command. The carrier groups are intrinsic to this and will remain 
so in the near future. According to him, the US has no objection to 
China’s rise. However, what is worrisome is its needless struggle for 
supremacy and the fact that it undermines the principles of peace and 
stability which have brought growth since 1945. He, thus, stresses on 
adherence to these principles, primarily freedom of navigation and the 
rule of law. 
While the US can take a detached view, this holds equal relevance 
for India. Free trade, which is essential for India’s growth, needs open 
sea lanes. In this regard, any unilateral restrictions to the internationally 
accepted order, which then becomes unacceptable, must be countered. 
However, this does not appear to be so. There is a further paradox in 
that while Ash Carter seeks this, the US has still not ratified the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This suggests 
that the statements ring hollow and reflect the reality that powerful 
nations operate according to their own vested interests.
It is this truth that India must contend with. China’s phenomenal 
rise and philosophy will drive it to push for benefits in every sphere. To 
which, an accommodative response will only encourage it further with 
resultant increase in tensions. While acting alone, no nation can face up to 
China; it is also true that except for North Korea and Pakistan, China has 
no allies. This, then, creates ground for other countries to get together 
and form a network, as Carter proposes. For a partnership or a network 
allows for greater flexibility than an alliance, more importantly, it can 
work towards the larger objective of the common good.
Ash Carter advocates that rather than deterrence by hard power 
alone, peace and stability can be ensured by multiple means and 
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highlighting other aspects such as the cost of conflict. The world is more 
interconnected than ever before and it is China which has much to lose 
from any unilateral or unprincipled action. Any change in the status quo is 
bound to invite reaction and approbation. It will also make other nations 
apprehensive in their dealings. India, with its size, shared border and 
history, thus, stands uniquely placed to exploit this aspect. The benefits 
of engagement far outweigh the negatives of war. This argument has to 
be presented from a position of strength and, with the support of others, 
could be most convincing. 
Advantage could be taken, given recent examples of economic 
coercion by China such as those in Sri Lanka, Maldives and Eritrea. There 
is also a growing realisation that China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
is likely to tie up countries in debt. All this has made countries wary and 
conditions for this network to ensure that everyone works in partnership 
are more favourable than ever before. 
There is a further argument that initiators of conflict in the past 
century have never succeeded and given the complications, it has only 
resulted in further disharmony and mayhem. With an ever present media, 
even a small incident can drive negative perceptions and, hence, a nation 
has to be careful of even a spark. Conditions in some ways are similar 
to 1914 when one assassin’s bullet started World War I. Larger nations, 
with disparate elements, must ensure greater control. That is, the logic of 
‘non-state actors’ or ‘radical anti-establishment elements’ has run its due 
course and cannot be accepted, at least not in India.
China’s development and prowess in the cyber domain too, have 
made the situation even more complicated. There is now the danger 
of ‘non-contact war’ which could also cover the financial and social 
spheres. The ramifications of this would be unpredictable and could lead 
to escalation and conflict. It must further be appreciated that this has 
the potential to create uncertainty in the nuclear realm. Half the world’s 
nuclear powers are in Asia and the two most unpredictable ones, Pakistan 
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and North Korea, are China’s allies. While Carter does not mention the 
nuclear aspects, it is a concern that countries in Asia must take note of. 
Given the tensions, any cyber uncertainty also runs the risk of a nuclear 
conflict, the effects of which will transcend borders.
An additional aspect that needs to be considered is that the re-balance, 
along with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was put forward by the 
previous US Administration. President Trump has a different market-
driven view. Under him, the US could become more isolationist. As 
mentioned by Carter, the sheer numbers of Asia will drive growth in the 
coming years. Hence, the current US leadership has to be convinced that 
for America’s continued ‘greatness’, peace and stability of Asia require 
its continued involvement. Also historically, no civilisation can continue 
in greatness. Any neglect of the US security role in Asia will only hasten 
its demise as a superpower and allow China’s rise in an earlier timeframe. 
There is also the possibility of an even closer Russia-China axis. All this 
constitutes a looming danger which the US and rest of the world need to 
take note of.
What lessons can India learn from all this? First and foremost, peace 
and stability of the region is foremost and the 21st century requires a 
new approach to ensure Vasudhaiva-Kutmabakam. Non-alignment must 
give way to partnership and a larger goal. This needs to be set down as a 
White Paper or national security strategy. It would not only tell the world 
what India seeks, but lay down guidelines for the defence forces and every 
other organ and institution of the state. A clear statement of intent could 
drive policy. Such a paper will set down the process of engagement and 
benefits of mutual cooperation as also how each nation, big or small, can 
play a part.
Next, within its stated policy of protecting its territorial integrity 
and sovereignty, India must strengthen its conventional and strategic 
deterrence. This must extend to the unconventional and emerging 
domains such as cyber. The shrinking of the defence budget needs to be 
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reversed. For a country with unsettled borders and two nuclear armed 
neighbours, which work in collusion, there remains no option. Border 
infrastructure has to be built up on priority.
Along with this, India must proactively work with every nation for the 
common goal of peace and stability and engage them at every fora. Given 
China’s importance, it must engage it as a partner in a spirit of mutual 
benefit. It must support China’s actions which are open, transparent 
and for the common good. At the same time, it must firmly oppose any 
unilateral violation or change in the status quo. To this extent it can stress 
on its historic legacy and outreach to Asia and how, for eons, it always 
spread the message of peace. This should include the Indian Ocean 
Region (IOR). Building of trust, especially between the defence forces, 
is a must. It must continually and increasingly engage in bilateral and 
multilateral exercises with all nations. The potential of the QUAD needs 
to be exploited, and partners need to be built upon, such as Indonesia, 
which is missing, and will sooner rather than later, have to be taken 
alongside. As has been accepted, India must seriously work on building 
self-sufficiency in defence hardware and seek technology for developing 
modern weapon systems. There is no option. Further, given the fractured 
polity, any acquisitions from abroad will always invite mudslinging and 
consequent delays.
In keeping with the importance of ensuring open sea lanes for all, 
it must develop its Navy and work with other nations for freedom of 
navigation in the Indian Ocean. This must also extend to disasters and 
humanitarian missions. Development of carrier groups, in both the 
eastern and western seaboards, is necessary as deterrents for the immediate 
future. Some will argue that given new weapon systems, these constitute 
vulnerabilities in any future conflict and may go the way of battleships. 
The fact, however, remains that in keeping with its location and size, such 
forces are a necessity. The budget for the Navy needs to be enhanced 
manifold.
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India must take a principled stance in keeping with international 
norms and seek compliance. China respects only strength, and the recent 
draw down on the Dalai Lama will only encourage it to further pressurise 
India. It must also fulfil any obligations and commitments in this regard. 
This must extend to all aspects of the global commons, including space.
India must remain wary of the fact that in international relations, 
nothing is permanent and thereby, be prepared to adapt to changing 
scenarios. The policy of non-alignment was suitable during the Cold War. 
Since then, India’s economic strength and stature have changed. It has to 
now adapt to be an equal partner. However, China will not like this, but 
it should be given no other option.
All actions should be driven from a position of respect and mutual 
benefit. The leadership must recognise that no nation has ever become 
great without sacrifice. If India has to be a part of the Asian story and 
achieve its rightful destiny, then firm resolve and action on its part are 
called for. The political leadership must understand that while there can 
be security without growth, there can be no growth without security. 
This change is needed now.
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